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Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of
Delmarva: MARYLAND FAILS
TO EXPAND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSAnON ACT
Recently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to take part in a trend occurring in a minority of jurisdictions, towards
the expansion of the "exclusive remedy" exceptions under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act). Md. Ann. Code, art. 10 1
(1985). In Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of
Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 503 A.2d
708 (1986), the court held that the intentional tort exception to the Act requires an
actual, specific and "deliberate intention"
of the employer to injure an employee. Id.
at 258,503 A.2d at 712. In so holding, the
court affirmed the Circuit Court for Somerset County's decision to dismiss a wrongful death and survivorship action brought
against an employer, by the estate of an
employee, who was killed during the course
of employment.
In Johnson, Rodney Adams, a sixteen
year old employee of Mountaire Farms of
Delmarva, Inc. (Mountaire), was electrocuted while at work. The electrocution occurred as Rodney was "using a sump pump
to remove liquid chicken fat and water from
a ground depression." !d. at 248, 503 A.2d
at 709. Approximately two months prior
to this accident, Mountaire had been cited
by the Maryland Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (MOSHA), for a
"serious violation" under article 89, §40(b)
of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1979).
A "serious violation" is defined by the statute as a condition existing in which "there
is a substantial probability that death or
serious physical harm could result .... "
Johnson, at 248, 503 A.2d at 709, n.1; Md.
Ann. Code art. 89, §40(b) (1979). Mountaire was issued this citation because of the
defective condition of the sump pump
which ultimately caused the electrocution.
The pump's extension cord cover was
broken and its wires exposed. Also, the
cord was improperly spliced and the plug
was missing a ground prong. Soon after
MOSHA issued the citation, Mountaire
deliberately misinformed MOSHA that
they had corrected the serious violation.
Thereafter, on June 3, 1981, Rodney was
electrocuted.
On January 17, 1983, Rodney's mother,
Nancy Johnson, individually and as personal representative of the estate of her
son, filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against Mountaire. Mrs. J ohnson alleged:
(1) that the deliberate intention exception of Art. 101, §44 does not require
the allegation or proofofthe employer's

actual intent to injure, but requires
only that the employer intentionally
do the act which happens to cause injury or death; and (2) thatthe deliberate
intention exception includes willful,
wanton, or reckless conduct undertaken with a knowledge and appreciation of a high degree of risk to another.
Johnson, at 254, 503 A.2d at 712.
Mountaire filed a special plea requesting dismissal of the action arguing that the
allegations in the claimant's declaration
did not satisfy the requirement of"deliberate intention to injure" as required under
§44 of the Act. !d. at 248,503 A.2d at 709.
On January 31, 1984, Judge Simpkin, of
the Circuit Court for Somerset County,
filed a Memorandum Opinion agreeing
with Mountaire and dismissed the case on
May 23, 1984. Johnson appealed to the
court of special appeals and also filed a
petition for writ of certiorari in the court
of appeals. The court of appeals granted
certiorari prior to consideration by the intermediate appellate court.
In her appeal, Johnson requested the
court to adopt the view that something less
than actual specific intention, on the part
of an employer to injure an employee, is
required to satisfy the deliberate intention
requirement of §44 of the Act. This section states in pertinent part that:
[i]f injury or death results to a workman from the deliberate intention of
his employer to produce such injury
or death, the employee ... shall have
the privilege either to take under this
article, or have a cause ofaction against
the employer, as if this article had
never been passed.
Johnson alleged that a showing of gross,
wanton or reckless negligence, and that the
employer provided an unsafe workplace
was sufficient under the Act. In support of
this proposition, Johnson cited decisions
from West Virginia and Ohio.
In Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.,
161 W.Va. 695,246 S.E.2d 907 (1978), the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that an employee could sue his employer for damages when the employers
conduct, which causes injury or death, was
"willful, wanton and reckless ... " Johnson,
at 253,503 A.2d at 711, citing, Mandolidis,
246 S.E.2d at 914. The Ohio Supreme
Court in Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron
Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 433
N.E.2d 572 (1982), held that an employer
could be held liable to an injured employee
in tort if the employer knew or should have
known that an employee may be injured as
a result of unsafe work conditions. Johnson, at 253, 503 A.2d at 711.

In declining to expand Maryland's intentional tort exception to the exclusivity
rule under the Act, the court first looked to
the history and legislative intent of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The court
noted that the first legislation in Maryland
designed to compensate injured employees
was passed by the Maryland General Assembly in 1914. The Workmen's Compensation Act was designed to strike a "balance between workers and employers ...
[whereby] [w]orkers lost their right to sue
their employers for negligence but gained
the right to quick and certain compensation
for injuries sustained during the course of
their employment, regardless offault." Id.
at 250, 503 A.2d at 710. On the other
hand, the employer's liability is limited in
exchange for losing the "defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk
and the fellow servant rule." Id.
The court further explained that §15 of
the Act outlines the employer's duties and
liabilities in the event that an employee is
disabled or killed from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his
employment. This section of the Act states
that "[t]he liability prescribed by ... [this
Act] shall be exclusive ... " Maryland Annotated Code, article 101 §15 (1985). In
interpreting the Act, the court held that
aside from the exclusions under the Act
itself, the remedies under the Act are exclusive of all other remedies.
Finally, the court held that Rodney's
death did not fall within any exceptions
under the Act. The court found that under
§44 there must be a deliberate intention
on the part of the employer to injure the
employee. The court went on to state that
the vast majority of jurisdictions define
"deliberate intention" under workmen's
compensation statutes as requiring specific
intention to cause death or injury, coupled
with some action to accomplish this result.
Johnson, at 252, 503 A.2d at 711; citing,
2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, §68.13 (1983); Restatement
(2nd) of Torts, §500 Comment F (1965);
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, §8 (5th ed.
1984). In adopting the majority view, the
court held that Johnson had failed to allege
sufficient facts to fall within the exception
of §44, and thus the wrongful death and
survivorship actions were properly dismissed.
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(Supp. 1985).
871d. § 9-102(a)(ii).
881d. § 9-102(a)(2).
891d. § 9-102(b)(I).
90ld. § 9-102(2).
911d. § 9-102(3)(c).
921d. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
931d.
941d. at 817.
9sld.
961d. at 82l.
97 See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411,
484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1984)(In prosecution for sexual assault and child abuse the defendant waived his right to confrontation by threatening to kill the victim).
98
525 S.W.2d. 336 (1975).
991d. at 339.
100Mattox, 156 U.S. at 237.
10lDouglas, 380 U.S. at 415.
102 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1984).
103See id. at 484 A.2d at 1332. Although the court
used the term "videotape," the procedures to be
employed are analogous to closed circuit television.
104Id., 484 A.2d at 1334.
105 Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1212, 1214 (1977).
1061d.
107 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
108 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (quoting Chambers, 410
U.S. at 295).
109 See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, ...").
l1OU.S. CaNST. amend. VI.
111U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV.
112U.S. CaNST. amend. I.
113 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,23 (1967).
1141d. at 23 n. 2l.
l1SU.S. CaNST. amend. VI.
116 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 604 (1982).
117Id. at 606-07.
118See California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528,
2532, (1984) ("Under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of
fundamental fairness").
119 E.g., Some videotape statutes permit the admission of videotape testimony, recorded prior to
trial, in lieu of direct testimony at trial.
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Gerant and Coddington then flew a 1966
Beechcraft from Ft. Lauderdale to South
Although the court's decision in Johnson
Carolina. There was circumstantial eviis in line with the majority of other state
dence suggesting that the Beechcraft carholdings, it is at odds with the slowly deried the ten kilograms of cocaine. Butler
veloping current trend. In fact, on May 31,
flew a 1969 Aerostar from Ft. Lauderdale
1985, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
to South Carolina with a passenger, Hanna.
All parties involved in the deal met at a
held that §44 of the Act allows an employee
Howard Johnson's and eventually all were
to hold his employer's insurer liable under
the theory of intentional infliction of emo- . arrested, with the exception of Coddington,
tional distress resulting from the actions of who escaped. In addition to recovering the
cocaine from an automobile, a search of
the insurer. Young v. Hartford Accident &
the hotel rooms revealed an electric money
Indemnity, 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270
counter, a microscope, several guns, $4,960
(1985); see also Gallagher v. Bituminous
in cash and a marijuana cigarette. A search
Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 303
of the Beechcraft revealed documents inMd. 201,492 A.2d 1280 (1985). Johnson
dicating that Gerant and Butler were on
seems to put an end to any further expandthe plane in the Bahamas three months
ing of the exclusive remedy exceptions unearlier.
der the Act. In Maryland, as in the majorUnder authority granted by 21 U.S.C.
ity of jurisdictions, without a showing of
§881 (b)(4), law enforcement officers seized
a "deliberate intention" to injure an emthe two airplanes once it was determined
ployee, an employer will not be held liable
they were used to promote the drug transoutside of the Act, no matter how grossly
action. Forfeiture proceedings against Tonegligent he might be. The end result in
tal Time Aircraft, Inc., the owner of the
Johnson was that Rodney Adams' estate,
Beechcraft, and Sundance Air, Inc., the
because Rodney had no dependents, could
owner of the Aerostar, were instituted in
only recover medical and funeral expenses.
federal district court. The consolidated
-Stephen A. Markey, III
cases were tried without a jury and the district court ruled both aircraft were subject
to forfeiture. Sundance Air is a Florida
corporation wholly owned by Gerant. The
district court determined that by transporting two drug conspirators, Gerant was
u.s. V. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft:
utilizing the corporation's plane to assist in
COURT UPHOLDS THIRD PARTY
the illegal act ofselling cocaine. Therefore,
FORFEITURE UNDER 21 U.S.C.
the Aerostar was used to "facilitate the
§881
sale, transportation, possession or concealment of cocaine" which the corporation
In U.S. v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft, 777
was aware of through its owner and was
F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985), the United States
subject to forfeiture. Id. at 949.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed precedents from the Second, Fifth
Total Time, is also a Florida corporation
and Eleventh Circuits to hold that the use
owned by David and Virgil Seeright. Total
of an airplane to transport conspirators to
Time allowed Gerant touse the Beechcraft
on several occasions, including the trip to
the scene of a drug deal exposes that vehicle
South Carolina. The district court found
to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §881 (1982).
that the Beechcraft transported the cocaine
The court further held that an airplane
on this particular trip, concluding that it
owned by an uninvolved third party was
was used to further the "sale, transportasubject to forfeiture because of his "conscious indifference." !d. at 952.
tion, possession or concealment" of cocaine
In early 1983, an informant in Greenville,
in violation of21 U.S.c. §881(a)(4). It further found that David Seeright, the corpoSouth Carolina contacted the Drug Enforceration's president, did not inquire into the
ment Agency (DEA) about a possible co"purpose of the trip, or what cargo would
caine sale. The informant was directed to
be carried, required no signed contract,
negotiate a buy and a DEA surveillance ophad no clear understanding as to when the
eration began. The informant arranged a
plane would be returned, and received no
deal with Brown and Montgomery to buy
money for its use." Id. at 950. In addition,
ten kilograms of cocaine for $500,000. In
a flight plan was not filed and there was no
late February, Montgomery flew to Ft.
insurance on the plane. The district court
Lauderdale, Florida to meet with Gerant
concluded that Total Time did nothing to
and Butler, the cocaine suppliers, and
guard against the illegal use of its plane,
Coddington, a middleman, to negotiate the
and therefore, was not an "innocent owner"
purcnase. After weighing the cocaine and
within the meaning of the Supreme Court's
checking its purity, Montgomery flew back
decision in Calero- Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
to Greenville.
continued from page 17
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